In this paper, we present a refinement of a Control Flow Analysis aimed at studying information flow security in the the calculus of Mobile Ambients. The improvements are achieved by making the analysis be flow-sensitive: the analysis is able to keep track of temporal dependencies of capabilities application when computing a safe approximation of the run-time topology of Mobile Ambient processes.
Introduction
In the context of distributed systems, where resources and data are shared among users located almost everywhere, it is likely that a user gets some (possibly) malicious programs from an untrusted source on the net and executes them inside its own system with unpredictable results. Moreover, it could be the case that a system completely secure inside, results to be insecure when performing critical activities such as electronic commerce or home banking, due to a "weak" mechanism for remote connections.
These security issues constitute a very interesting workbench to evaluate the theoretical and practical impact of static analysis techniques. Giving a way for statically verifying a security property has, in principle, the advantage of making the checking of the properties more efficient; moreover it allows us to write programs which are secure-by-construction, e.g., when the performed analysis is proved to imply some behavioural security properties. As most non-trivial properties of the run-time behaviour of a program are either undecidable or NP, it is not possible to detect them accurately, and some form of approximation is needed. So, in general, we expect to produce a possibly larger set of possibilities than what will ever happen during execution of the program.
The purpose of Control Flow Analysis (CFA) [11] is to statically predict safe and computable approximations to the dynamic behaviour of programs. It can be expressed using different formulations such as the constraint-based formalism popular for the analysis of functional and object-oriented languages, or the Flow Logic style [3, 10, 14] . As in type systems, Flow Logic makes a clear distinction between the specification of when an analysis proposed solution is acceptable for a program, and the actual computation of the analysis information. By predicting the behaviour of a system, it leads to positive information also when the system under evaluation does not satisfy the property of interest, whereas the type-system approach is given in terms of prescriptive rules (a system is either accepted or discarded). In several recent developments it has been demonstrated that Flow Logic is a robust approach that is able to deal with a variety of calculi of computation: the lambda-calculus, Concurrent ML, the imperative object calculus, the pi-calculus [1] , the Mobile Ambients calculus [9, 12, 13] , and the spi-calculus [2] .
In [5] , we applied the Flow Logic-based control flow analysis proposed in [9] to verify absence of information flow in processes modelled in Mobile Ambients [7] . In order to study this problem as much abstractly as possible, the "pure" Mobile Ambients calculus is considered, in which no communication channels are present, and the only possible actions are represented by the moves performed by mobile processes. This allows the study of a very general notion of information flow which should be applicable also to different versions of the calculus such as, e.g., Boxed Ambients [6] , BioAmbients [15] , and Safe Ambients [8] . In particular, a new notion of security boundary [5] has been introduced to model multi-level security policies in this scenario. Information leakage may be expressed in terms of the possibility for a hostile ambient to access confidential data that are not protected inside a security boundary.
With this work, we refine even further the analysis of [5] in order to make it flow-sensitive. More specifically, (i) the solution is a power-set of process representations, not just a single flat representation; (ii) by tagging new pairs as active and recording which capabilities are enabled, the analysis keeps track of temporal dependencies of capabilities application. The implementation of the refined Control Flow Analysis can be easily integrated to the Banana tool [4] . The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the basic terminology of the Mobile Ambient calculus, and briefly report a Control Flow Analysis aiming at computing a safe approximation of the possible ambient nestings occurring the run-time execution of a process. Then, we describe how to formalise multi-level security in the setting of Mobile Ambients. In Section 3, we propose a refinement of the analysis in order to make it flow-sensitive.
Background

The Ambient Calculus
The Mobile Ambient calculus has been introduced in [7] with the main purpose of explicitly modelling mobility. Indeed, ambients are arbitrarily nested boundaries which can move around through suitable capabilities. The syntax of processes is given as follows, where n ∈ Amb denotes an ambient name.
Intuitively, the restriction (νn)P introduces the new name n and limits its scope to P ; P | Q is P and Q running in parallel; replication provides recursion and iteration. By n a [ [ P ] ] we denote the ambient named n with the process P running inside it. The capabilities in t n and out t n move their enclosing ambients in and out ambient n, respectively; the capability open t n is used to dissolve a sibling ambient n. Labels on ambients and on transitions are introduced as it is customary in static analysis to indicate "program points".
The operational semantics of a process P is given through a suitable reduction relation → and a structural congruence ≡ between processes. Intuitively, P → Q represents the possibility for P of reducing to Q through some computation (see also [7] ). For instance, let P 1 be a process modelling an envelope sent from venice to london:
Initially, envelope is in site venice. Then, it exits venice and enters site london by applying its capabilities out venice and in london, respectively. Once site london receives envelope, it reads its content by consuming its open envelope capability. Finally, process P 1 reaches the state:
To express multi-level security policies, information is classified into different levels of confidentiality. This is obtained by exploiting the labelling of ambients. In particular, the set of ambient labels is partitioned into three disjoint sets: high, low and boundary labels. Ambients labelled with boundary labels (boundary ambients) are the ones responsible for confining confidential information. Information leakage occurs if, during the execution of the process, a high level ambient is not confined inside a boundary, thus being possibly exposed to a malicious ambient attack. For instance, let P 2 be an extension of process P 1 , in which the envelope contains confidential data hdata (labelled high) which needs to be safely sent from venice to london.
In this case, venice, envelope and london must be labelled boundary to protect hdata during the whole execution. (See [5] for more detail.)
A Control Flow Analysis for Mobile Ambients
A first Control Flow Analysis aiming at modelling the possible nesting of processes occurring at run-time was proposed in [9] . In the case of Mobile Ambients, the control structure computed by the analysis is expressed by the hierarchical structure of ambients, given by the father-son relationship between the nodes of the tree structure. The analysis was not security-oriented, thus it did not exploit the information about "secure" nestings inside boundaries.
In [5] , we proposed a more accurate abstract domain that separately considers nesting inside and outside security boundaries, yielding to a much more sophisticated control flow analysis for detecting unwanted boundary crossing, i.e., information leakage. The main idea is to distinguish among nestings either protected or unprotected by boundaries. More specifically, the analysis is expressed in terms of tuple (Î B ,Î E ,Ĥ), where:
• The first and the second component (Î B andÎ E ) are elements of ℘(Lab a × Lab). If process P , during its execution, contains an ambient labelled a having inside either a capability or an ambient labelled , then ( a , ) is expected to belong toÎ B orÎ E depending on the level of protection of the nesting (with B standing for Boundary, and E standing for External environment).
• The third componentĤ ∈ ℘(Lab a × Amb) keeps track of the correspondence between names and labels. If process P contains an ambient labelled a with name n, then ( a , n) is expected to belong toĤ.
The analysis is defined by a representation and a specification functions [11] . The representation function aims at mapping concrete values to their best abstract representation. The representation function collects inÎ B (Î E ) all the nestings of ambients initially (not) contained in at least one boundary ambient. It is given in terms of a function β B (P ) which maps process P into a triplet (Î B ,Î E ,Ĥ) corresponding to the initial state of P , with respect to an enclosing ambient labelled with .
The specification states a closure condition of a triplet (Î B ,Î E ,Ĥ) with respect to all the possible moves executable on a process P . It mostly relies on recursive calls on subprocesses except for the three capabilities open, in, and out. For lack of space, in Figure 1 we report only the rule for out-capability. Within the specification, the predicate path B ( a , ) is used to simplify the notation: it represents an protected path of nestings from ambient labelled a to ambient labelled , in which none of the ambients is a boundary. The rule for the out-capability states that if some ambient labelled a has an outcapability t on an ambient n, that may apply due to the presence of a direct ancestor ambient labelled a whose name is n, then the result of performing that capability should also be recorded in eitherÎ E orÎ B , depending on the level of protection of the newly generated nestings. The rule is split into three distinct cases: (i) an ambient exits a boundary, thus moving to an unprotected environment, (ii) all ambients are protected, and finally (iii) all ambients are unprotected. In the first case, all the nestings from the moving ambient a to new protecting boundaries have to be copied inÎ E , since after the out move they become unprotected. The in and open-capabilities behave similarly. The result of the analysis should be read, as expected, in terms of information flows. No leakage of secret data/ambients outside the boundary ambients is possible if in the analysis h (a high level datum) does not appear in any of the pairs belonging toÎ E . Example 2.1 Let P 3 be a process modelling the fact that confidential data hdata is inserted inside a secure envelope before, possibly, being sent in the insecure external environment.
Notice that in the pure Ambient calculus there are not communication primitives. In the absence of such primitives, the exchange of an envelope between a Sender (site venice, in our example) and a Receiver may be modelled as a sequence of out Sender and in Receiver actions, performed by ambient envelope. In this way envelope moves from Sender to Receiver, where it will be opened in order to read its contents (ambient hdata, in our case).
In this case, ambient hdata behaves correctly with respect to information leakage since it never exits the boundary venice. However, if we compute the CFA, we obtain that the pair (env, h) appears inÎ E , env denoting the external environment, thus leading to a false alarm. 2
A Flow-Sensitive Control Flow Analysis
The CFA of Section 2.2 is both context and flow-insensitive: it does not consider the temporal order in which the capabilities are executed, and it is not able to distinguish between blocking and non-blocking capabilities in a capability path. Consider again process P 3 of Example 2.1: in this case, capability out c2 venice is executed only if capability in c1 envelope has been consumed, i.e., only when ambient hdata is inside envelope, and consequently the outcapability is not enabled. On the contrary, the analysis considers also the case in which the out-capability is consumed, both when ambient hdata is inside venice (i.e., an old snapshot of the system), and when it is inside envelope (i.e., the system's situation after the in-movement).
In order to refine the analysis, so that it recognizes when a capability is enabled or not (i.e., it is ready to be consumed), and if a pair inÎ B orÎ E represents either an old snapshot of the system or the current situation, we enrich the abstract domains by:
• adding a fourth component, L, which is a set of lists of capabilities' labels.
More specifically, each list represents an ordered sequence of the capabilities' labels along a path, thus the head of each list is an enabled capability • tagging pairs inÎ B orÎ E with A or NA, denoting if a pair is active or not (i.e., it occurs, but it cannot be used to generate further nestings since it belongs to an old snapshot of the system). To this aim, we define a function Φ which, given a pair, complements the tag (e.g, Φ(( , ) A ) = ( , ) NA ). For example, in process P 3 , at the beginning (b 1 , h) A , but once hdata moves inside envelope it must change to (b 1 , h) NA .
The result of the analysis is a power-set of representations of processes: S = {(Î B ,Î E ,Ĥ, L)}. Also in this case, the analysis is given in terms of a representation and of a specification function. The representation function collects all the initial nesting among ambients and capabilities, tagging with A only ambient nestings and the pairs ( , t ) where t is the label of an enabled capability. Again, we do not report the whole analysis specification. Instead, we explain how it differs from [5] by considering, e.g., the out-capability (see Figure 2 ). The rule for the out-capability states that the capability is considered only if it is enabled. If this is the case, then the result of performing that capability should also be recorded in eitherÎ E orÎ B , depending on the level of protection of the newly generated nestings. In addition, the tags of the pairs involved in the movement should be updated consequently, and t deleted from the head of a list in L. The result of the analysis should be read, as expected, in terms of information flows. No leakage of secret data/ambients outside the boundary ambients is possible if in the analysis h (high level datum) does not appear in any of the pairs belonging to any of theÎ E sets in S. Finally, none of the capabilities enabled can be consumed, thus the fixedpoint algorithm stops. The two snapshots added to the solution represent two possible traces of the run-time execution of process P 3 . Also in this case, the results should be read in term of information flow: since h does not appear in I E , the analysis correctly verifies that there is no information leakage. 2
